Building on a Cracked Foundation

Building on a Cracked Foundation

An Analysis of the Election Registration Process in Sudan
and its Impact on the Potential for Free and Fair Elections


9 February 2010

Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 1
Flaws in the Legal Framework ___________________________________________ 4
Registration of Minors ___________________________________________________ 5
Temporary Residents ____________________________________________________ 5
Registration of Military Personnel in their Place of Work _____________________ 6
Impediments in Access to Registration ____________________________________ 7
Inadequate Transparency in the Opening and Schedules of Registration Centres _ 8
Shortages in Voter Registration Materials and Logistical Support _______________ 9
Registration in Darfur ___________________________________________________ 10
International Registration ________________________________________________ 11
Political Obstruction of Registration Monitoring __________________________ 12
Political Party Involvement and Intimidation ______________________________ 12
Manipulation after the Registration Process ______________________________ 14
Human Rights Violations and Suppression of Political Expression __________ 16
Recommendations _____________________________________________________ 17

Introduction
On 1 November 2009, registration for national elections slated to be held in April 2010 began throughout Sudan. Originally intended to end on 30 November, the process was extended one week until 7 December as many election stakeholders requested the National Elections Commission (NEC) to extend the registration period. The registration – a critical first step in the electoral process – occurred against the backdrop of a contentious political environment marked by political obstruction of peaceful political activities and human rights abuses, and an overall tightening of restrictions on civil and political freedoms. According to the NEC, at least 75.8% of eligible Sudanese were registered, which was quite close to the national target of 80%. This aggregate figure represents a 71% rate of registration of the eligible electorate in the North, and 98% in the South, respectively.1 The accuracy of these statistics, however, is thrown into doubt by dispute over the results of the 2008 census, which forms the basis of the estimation of potential voters. In South Sudan, there was particular pressure to register as a means of compensating for, or disputing, census figures which were felt to grossly underestimate the population of the South. Some of the states in the South have exceeded in registering over 100 % of eligible voters, according to the census.

It is important to note that in some respects the registration programme was successful. The fact that the NEC conducted an inclusive voter registration process in spite of considerable logistical and security challenges and shortfalls in civic education is a significant achievement. The NEC also extended voter registration by one week at the insistence of Southern political parties, which had a positive impact on the possibility for Southerners to exercise their right of franchise. While the extension was a positive step, had the NEC and local elections committees’ better publicised locations for registration and the centre’s schedules and conducted more thorough education programmes, the extension might not have been necessary.

Indeed, despite the successes of the process in carrying out an extensive registration, there were a number of serious flaws in the process. These flaws undermine the potential for successful elections in April by both undermining public confidence and building the electoral process on a flawed structure.
One serious flaw was the failure of the NEC and other relevant political actors to conduct broad civic education campaigns and properly train registration officials. These steps were imperative, especially as elections have not occurred in Sudan since 1986. Many Sudanese remain uneducated about the electoral process itself, participatory rights, and the significance of the elections generally and in the particular context of their place in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Indeed, some communities initially hesitated to register as they believed that they were being taxed. Even where citizens were aware of the purpose of registration, they were often ill informed about the elections themselves. This represents a huge missed opportunity to address civic engagement and participatory rights in Sudan. The lack of serious efforts made on civic education actually goes back to the lack of political interest to disseminate and educate Sudanese citizens on the CPA.
In addition to this failure to expand the technical registration process to support the broader goals of civic engagement and participation, Sudanese and international observers and monitors, national political party agents, and civil society observed a number of serious flaws in the process. For example, a number of instances of blocked access to registration sites were documented. In other instances people were registered inappropriately, either those who were under age or were registered in inappropriate locations. Election monitors were harassed in some instances and instances of tampering or intimidation following the registration was observed.
The report begins with an overview of the legal framework, pointing out significant flaws. It then goes on to describe a series of election violations before making recommendations. For the purposes of this report, these violations are grouped around four pillars. These are:

o Illegal registration of individuals;
o Impediments in access to registration;
o Political obstruction of registration monitoring; and
o Manipulation following the registration process.

Flaws in the Legal Framework
Elections in Sudan are regulated by the National Elections Act, passed in the National Assembly’s Sixth Session, on 7 July 2008. The law has been significantly criticised as an insufficient basis for undertaking democratic elections. Importantly, the law provided for the creation of the NEC which is tasked with overseeing the entire electoral process.
A particular structural concern with regard to the NEC is the potential for political manipulation of its composition. Under the law, Commissioners are to be appointed by the President. Although in accordance with Article 6 (1), the First Vice President of Sudan (currently the leader of the SPLM, Salva Kiir) may raise objections to the appointment of officials to the Commission, he may not suggest alternatives. Candidates must also be confirmed by a two thirds majority in the National Assembly, but this body is dominated by the NCP and SPLM. The fact that the President plays such an important role in naming candidates risks undermining the independence and credibility of the NEC.2

The NEC has been invested with wide-ranging power, and has the ability to name committees responsible for supervising elections and the referendum at the regional and state level.3 Local Popular Committees (local governance structures often made up of NCP members), and native and traditional authorities are empowered to authenticate personal identification documents for voters in accordance with Article 22(b), despite the fact that they are not bound by the provisions and regulations of the Act, and may not be qualified to play this role. The integrity and independence of the NEC has come under serious attacks from political parties and observers, in particular on the power exercised by the secretariat of the commission. In some occasions, the Secretariat has issued procedures and accreditation letters to some groups prior to even setting the relevant rules for the process.

Illegal registration of individuals
The NEC’s Civic/Voter Education Guidebook stated that eligibility would be restricted to Sudanese of “at least 18 years of age, of sound mind, who are resident in the constituency where they are registering for at least 3 months before the date of closure of the register, and that they must not be registered in another constituency”.4 Should a registration officer have doubt of a person’s identity, eligible voters must also bring supporting documents or an individual who can verify their identity.5 The Guidebook also provides that where a registrant appears to be under the age of 18, it is at the discretion of the registration officers to ask for further identification.

However, during the elections process the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies and other monitors documented underage individuals and temporary or non- residents being registered throughout the registration process. In many places, these technical irregularities were in fact authorised and allowed by the NEC.

Many officials adopted a laissez-faire approach to the registration of their constituencies, with individuals being registered who did not live in the area, or did not provide all the information stipulated by the NEC’s Registration Form 5, the official form approved for use in the registration process. The procedural guidelines of the Elections Act of 2008 had laid the groundwork for the NEC’s establishment of protocol. In many centres in the North, Form 5 was not used in the registration process, and an alternate version – without areas for input on place of residence, exact address, and how long one had been resident in that particular constituency – were missing.

In many places, registration officials did not verify registrants’ age, nationality, or duration of residence, or if they had already been registered. Throughout the registration period, registration occurred without ID in Constituency 19 of Omdurman and Constituency 29 of El Hag Yousif. Some observers noted that the process was positively inclusive – citizens lacking identity documents were able to substantiate their identities through traditional authorities and local administrative structures.

In Khartoum and other areas of the North, local popular committees were often present to present certification for proof of residency certificates, if needed. Although this atmosphere of inclusiveness is to be commended, the possibility for manipulation through these structures should also be noted, as these committees are often made up of NCP members. While their contributions in terms of logistics and services were welcome, Sudanese civil society groups monitoring the registration process complained of lack of verification standards on residency.6 Checks on the distribution of residency documents appeared weak, and given the partisan nature of the NCP, this created some the perception of bias in the process of identifying registrants. Officers often failed to inform registrants of their rights and responsibilities, including reviewing and challenging the preliminary voters’ registry.

Registration of Minors
The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies and a number of other monitors observed underage citizens being registered, and in some places being encouraged to do so. It should be noted that a flexible approach was acknowledged as necessary, especially as birth documentation is lacking in many areas in Sudan. Indeed, UNICEF estimates that only 32.6% of children under 5 had been provided with birth registration in 2006.7 In tribal communities, age may be measured by events that happened before the individual’s birth, making age difficult to verify.

Although a flexible approach was needed, this process appears to have been manipulated. Many registration centres had large amounts of underage registrants, including:

o Nyala City, South Darfur Constituency 7,
o Nyala East, South Darfur Constituency 9
o North Khartoum in Constituencies number 14 and 15,
o Al Gezira State Central Sudan in Constituency 22,
o El Hag Yousif in Khartoum State Constituency 29,
o Constituency 26 in Salaite Khartoum North ,
o Constituency 44 in Gadarif, Eastern Sudan
o Constituency 18 in Lagawa in South Kordufan

In other areas underage registrants appeared to have been encouraged by political parties to register:

o In Kenana, White Nile State 22 girls in County School 122, ages 15-17, were registered;
o In Khasham Algebra In Eastern Sudan, Constituency 15, nine minors under the age of 18 were registered at Sangat School;
o In the Red Sea State, students under the age of 18 were registered;
o Underage students in Alkhalawi (a Quran-teaching traditional Islamic school ) were registered at their schools and dormitories, and police and security were often present at local registration centres.

Temporary Residents
Although the registration guidelines indicated that persons registering should have been resident in the areas for at least three months, the African Centre observed a number of registrations of temporary residents, particularly students. For example:

o In Al Thura, Umdurman town Constituency 50, students living in temporary accommodation were registered, despite having been resident in that constituency less than 3 months;
o On 24 November in Al Thura, Umdurman Constituency 50, students living in a boarding school were registered;
o According to the testimony of students from Umdurman Islamic University, 200 students were registered, despite having been resident in the area for less than one month; and
o In Alburkal Shamal, Northern State, underage students from Barber University were registered by NCP members, despite having lived in the area less than one month.

Similar violations of elections procedure were observed by agents of political parties. In their report on the registration process, they noted that:

o In Constituency 9 of Al Gezira state, NCP members and the Administrator of Student Activities (a government appointed position), Medani Alshamalia Alousta, used government vehicles to recruit students supported by the NCP from dormitories to register, despite them having been resident in the area less than 3 months. When complaints were made to the High Election Committee of the NEC, they decreed that the registration of students should continue and that any complaints should be lodged before the appeals committee within the period of appeals. The High Election Committee added names of new people who were not registered during registration, and stated that these names had been provided by Taha Fadl Alah, the Executive Director of the NCP in the state.
o In Constituency Number 13 of Wad Rawa in Al Gezira State East, minors were recruited to be registered by the local governor, who also participated in intimidating various political party representatives.
o In Algadarif and Sharakalia Eastern Sudan, many minors were registered, as well as Ethiopian women in Algadarif.

Registration of Military Personnel in their Place of Work

The NEC’s registration manual informed voters to return to their place of registration to vote, but since then the NEC has announced that not all voters will cast their ballots in the same location as registration.
By and large, military personnel, security service members, and police officers were registered in their place of work rather than area of residence. Registration in one’s place of work is in contravention of the provisions of Article 22 of the 2008 Election Act. When registration monitors and political party observers complained, the NEC issued a statement on 24 October allowing for this process. After this, the registration of military personnel in their place of work began everywhere, even in Darfur.

This raises a number of concerns. One is that military personnel may be able to register in more than one place. Another is that the government may seek to affect registration demographically, in particular in areas where it lacks a constituency. Given the low registration overall in Darfur, registration of military officials may have an undue impact on overall election results. In light of the possibility of heightened tensions in the run-up to the elections, the NEC and State elections committees in Darfur must take action to ensure that the presence of security forces is sufficient to secure public order and protect civilians, but circumscribed to its appropriate role. In no manner should NISS agents and security forces be assisting in the registration process, as this threatens to discourage political opponents or marginalised groups from registering.

A number of specific incidents of registration of individuals in their place of work were observed by the African Centre, for example:

o On 3 November, law enforcement registration took place in the Purri Area, Constituencies 36 and 37, Khartoum North, Constituency 39 in Khartoum South, Constituency 40 in Arkawiet, Riyadh, and Al Gerief in Khartoum State in Constituency 3 in Khartoum.
o In Kasala Alshargia, Eastern Sudan Constituency 2, Registration Centre 6, police officers were registered though they were not residents of the area;
o In Sharg Al Gezira locality, Gazira State, Constituency 15 of Rufaa Alousta, Hay Altadamun and members of the NCP recruited police officers to register under the direct order of high ranks, in violation to the election act, which considers registration as personal responsibility;
o In Constituency 40, in registration centre 6 in Arkaweet and Altayf in Khartoum State , 368 members of the NISS were registered, as were over 200 police officers. Though observers protested, their rejection was refused.
o In Constituency 4 a civilian car was used to transport policemen from Halfa Aljadeda Alwosta Eastern Sudan to Registration Centre 16 at Nadi Alishlag.

Impediments in Access to Registration
In many instances, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies observed impediments in access to registration. In many instances registration centres were opened and closed without sufficient prior notification and advertisement of the surrounding populations. In South Sudan, where access was a major challenge in the registration process, mobile registration units were useful, but local populations were often unaware that a registration centre would be present in the area until it arrived. Those living at some distance from the site might have to travel to it and in some cases may not have been informed in time to ensure that they could register. In some of these remote locations, telephone access was not regular, and so registration numbers could not be called in on a regular basis, as provided for in registration procedures.

An additional concern has been the regional variation in registration rates. Although with the extension all states were able to register at least half of their estimated eligible voters, 13 of Sudan’s 25 states fell short of the NEC’s target numbers for registration, including sensitive areas such as all three states in Darfur, South Kordofan and Jongelei.8

Registration in Abyei was the first electoral activity to take place there for many years. However, the special needs of the region, given its special status and definition under the CPA as being represented geographically by both South Kordofan and Warrap states required special treatment by the NEC and state committees. Unfortunately, however, the population in Abyei remained confused over how registration would be linked to the popular consultation. Abyei officials were left largely in the dark during the registration process.

Substantial delays and gaps in registration occurred in Western Equatoria and Jongelei states in the South. In spite of high levels of registration, civic participation and engagement varied greatly throughout Sudan’s regions. Given Sudan’s historical imbalances, marginalisation, and regional iniquities in the countries’ peripheries, the uneven results risk reinforcing traditional differences and the perception or reality of marginalisation, rather than building a truly inclusive political process.

More ethnically homogenous populations appear to have been registered at higher rates than areas with substantial diversity; Khartoum State, the most diverse state in Sudan, registered the lowest percentage of voters despite holding the capital of Sudan.

Inadequate Transparency in the Opening and Schedules of Registration Centres
One particular concern in terms of access to voter registration was a lack of clarity and public information about the schedules and locations of centres. Some registration centres were opened before the announced times. In Port Sudan, Eastern Sudan, registration centres were also closed and reopened; one of the registration centres closed had significantly higher serial numbers recorded in the registration books than had been noted at the end of the day before. For example, in Hay Transit the centre was closed with serial number 421, and reopened as number 612. In other cases, centres moved from place to place, and the police interrupted the work of the registration committees. In one instance, a centre was relocated to Eastern Sawakin, and moved inside a mosque. No representatives of any political parties were present. In the more peripheral areas, registration was undertaken through census lists. Some areas were not covered, including Hy Almatar Square 289, Hy Baghdad, Arkaweet, and Alsafa, all in Khartoum State.

Many decisions related to voter registration were announced only a short while before the process began, and certain operational and policy decisions had not been resolved by 1 November. Indeed in some states in the South registration started 3 days late as registration materials were not delivered on time. This placed tremendous pressure on election
management bodies, and challenged the work of those providing technical assistance. Officials were trained very late in the day, and in some cases only days prior to registration.

A number of specific examples were documented, including:

o On the 10th and 11th of November in Constituency 9 in the Al Riyadh area, Khartoum State, the registration centre was closed and relocated without informing the area’s constituents or observers. The public in the Al Riyadh area was entirely unaware of the new location and no public announcements or postings as to the relocation or the Centre’s schedule were made.
o In the Khartoum Airport neighbourhood, the local popular committee declared that the constituencies’ registration centre would be open on the 7th, 8th, and 11th of November. On the first day of registration, over 4,000 constituents registered. According to the 2008 census, however, only 716 citizens were resident in the Khartoum Airport neighbourhood.
o On 12 November in Al Gereif, a registration centre was opened without informing observers or political parties.
o In Nyala, South Darfur, registration centres remained open throughout the registration period in two sections of local high schools. The centres were run by members of the armed forces, and election observers and political party members were not notified.
o In El Hasahisa, Gezira State, Constituency Number 5 opened a registration centre in a home belonging to NCP member Ahmed Mansour, who did not allow some citizens to register. Registration took place for an entire day before the centre was moved to a different location.
o In Halfa Aljadeeda Alshamalia, Eastern Sudan, at constituency number 13, centre number 11 at Nadi Akobam was moved to Nadi Alamal without informing people.
o In Umarwaba, North Darfur, the registration centre was closed without giving information about where it was to be reopened and its schedule.

Similar incidents to the ones described above have been reported in registration centres in Port Sudan. In Kassala, complaints were lodged against the NEC in regards to the delayed opening of a registration centre, and that official observers did not receive badges to monitor the elections until two weeks into the registration period. Many centres closed before closing time, and police officers were seen collecting voter registration cards from people after their registration. The SPLM’s registration report noted that in Wad Alhilaw Centre 191 at Aradaiba School in Eastern Sudan, the registration centre was closed at 1 PM, much earlier than the announced closing time.

Shortages in Voter Registration Materials and Logistical Support
On occasion, shortages in registration materials interrupted registration in Unity, Western and Northern Bahr el Ghazal States in Southern Sudan, and Blue Nile and South Kordofan in the disputed “three areas”. Though the NEC did take steps to replenish these materials promptly, these preventable interruptions complicated the process of registration. In South Sudan, complaints were lodged by the governing SPLM, who felt that the lack of registration materials
and logistical support were rooted in the outcome of the 2008 census results, which they contend grossly underestimated the population of the South.

Registration turnout in the South was low in areas of insecurity caused by tribal conflict and LRA insecurity, as well as food shortages. Cross-community registration was a tenuous process, and in the first week and a half of registration in Pigi County, Jongelei state, community members refused and detained registration materials following the inclusion of Korwai Payam as a constituency, which is a community inhabited by Khorfulus in a traditional Atar area.
Additionally, registration was low amongst agro-pastoralist and migratory areas. Mobile registration teams were in some cases fearful of these groups, as they are often hostile to centres in which government programmes are present as they fear that the government will arrest those involved in cattle theft and tribal rivalry.

Mobile registration teams were intended to facilitate broad geographic coverage of the country during voter registration. In many places, however, dissemination of the information regarding registration schedules was simply not available. In some cases, mobile registration centres were used to go and register in areas where the NCP has constituents.

The following particular incidents were documented:

o The NEC had not provided mobile registration teams for voter registration in Cuibet county communities in Lakes State like Pagor, Duong, and Abiriu. Key supplies were missing at existing areas, hindering operations. A member of the registration team stated that “our roads are not accessible, there are far distant places like Reel which border Rumbek Central and Rumbek North at a distance of 35 miles; vulnerable groups including elderly people and pregnant women could not manage to reach the voter registration because of distances and thirst”.9
o In Duong Centre, the voter registration was delayed from the 1 to 3 November due to lack of materials.
o In Rumbek North County insecurity due to cross-border rivalries with Warap State pastoralists hindered the registration process.

Registration in Darfur
One concern about the registration process nationally, and in Darfur particularly, was the presence and operations of government officials at registration sites. The government indicated that the volume of turnout showed that this policy did not have a negative impact on registration. The Commissioner of the NEC, Abel Alier, said on 2 December in North Darfur that the presence of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) at registration centres “further reaffirmed the absence of any security imbalance in the registration process, stressing
that the response of voters to register and their motivation forced the Committee to increase the number of centres and the staff of the registry”.10

The NEC did not provide instructions to state election committees on the participation of IDPs. In Khartoum and the surrounding area, registration centres allowed many IDPs to register. In Darfur, state elections committees did not and were not able to visit all IDP camps, including Kass and Kalma IDPs camps, which contributed to the low rate of registration in the three Darfuri states. In addition, until 7 December, registration had not begun in three of Darfur’s largest IDP camps: Abu Shouk, Al Salaam, and Zamzam in North Darfur, limiting access to registration procedures.11 Many Darfuris who did have access chose not to register, either owing to mistrust of the elections or fear of the presence of armed security actors and police in registration centres.

In addition, a number of particular violations were noted in the Darfur context, for example:

o In Saraf Umrah Constituency in South Darfur state, area 24 of Makuki and Koe, registration took place for some people more than once with the same name, e.g. of a Toma Mohamed Mustafa (#24397), and Nour Aldeen Sulieman Shogar (#245377).
o In Shamal Northern Kordofan, in Alnuhood, monitors observed that the serial numbers included in registration books at the end of the day were significantly higher the following day.
o The Governor of Alnuhood locality began a voting campaign inside the registration centre, which resulted in difficulties in carrying out the registration process.
o During a visit by the governor at Sharakalia Centre, registration was halted because ceremonies were organised inside the registration centre.
o In Aljudia area, South Darfur registration centre official refused to register Mashackh (local leaders) if they did not join the NCP.
o The Ghibaish Centre was closed for a meeting between local governors and the election committee.

In addition, in a recent article Dr. Anne Barlett, a professor at the University of San Francisco, alleged that new residents had been moved into Darfur and given retrospective citizenship papers and registered as voters.12

International Registration
Registration in the Diaspora was limited by the NEC, focusing mostly on those countries with substantial northern Sudanese populations including Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Washington, New York, and Los Angeles in the US. Although the number of overseas registrants was fairly minimal, countries that host large numbers of Sudanese refugees or students have not been included, such as Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Even in countries where registration was available, many Sudanese living abroad expressed concern about the registration process. Refugees may have no passports or national ID documents required for registration. Work IDs were refused as forms of identification, even though they were recognized by the 2008 Election Act.

Political Obstruction of Registration Monitoring
All parties were to be included in the voter registration process. But the reality is that Sudanese political life is very much dominated by two parties, the NCP in the North, and the SPLM in the South. Although political parties can be expected to engage in activities intended to encourage registration of their constituents, the use of state resources should not be used to facilitate partial or partisan registration. In addition, even where such activities do not constitute violations of electoral procedure, they contribute to an environment of domination by certain parties and undermine open contestation of the elections.

In addition, comprehensive monitoring of the registration and elections process is vital to ensure the credibility of the elections process and ensure buy in from all parties. However, there were a number of obstacles to observation in Sudan.

Legally, national and international observers to elections must be accredited by the NEC, who also holds the power to revoke their status. The NEC has indeed issued in the last minute of registration process accreditation to observers, and it is limited to the registration period, and not the entire election process. In addition, the chief of the polling centre has the power to exclude any person for any reason. According to Article 76 (4) of the 2008 Elections Act, they may “order the expulsion of any person whenever she or he contravenes the provisions of this Act or the Rules or commit any act that hinders the sorting and counting process”.13 In different parts of the country, party agents observing the registration process were excluded from the centres, and when they complained were threatened by security forces. Serious discrepancies in the registration occurred when the NEC obstructed technical aspects of the registration process and access to monitoring capabilities for election monitors and observers from political parties.

Political Party Involvement and Intimidation
Political party involvement in the registration process has been noted by various actors, including the NCP and SPLM. On 14 November, the SPLM called a meeting with all other Southern Sudanese operating in Lakes state. On the agenda was how to carry out voter registration with the participation of the other political parties. The meeting was held at the
SPLM Lakes State Secretariat office. A member of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr. Kuc Abyei said that “I like Southern Sudan better than the SPLM”, noting intimidation by the SPLM security agents present near polling areas, restricting the movement of party agents.

From 14-18 November all five counties of Northern Bahr el Ghazal state were missing voter registration materials. In Aweil, a member of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly said that communal registration centres were full because he and local authorities had arranged free transport for elderly people so that they did not have to walk long distances. Members of the legislature had returned to their communities with their own private automobiles in efforts to encourage registration, in areas such as Mangok and Yargot Payams. The General Paul Malong Awan Anei, Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, issued an order giving members of his cabinet – including civil servants – time off to abet voter registration in their constituencies.14 Though this is not directly a violation of election law, it does contribute to a sense of domination of the SPLM of political life in the South.

While the process appeared to be dominated by members of the NCP and SPLM, members of smaller parties attempting to observe and participate in the registration found themselves attacked and/or arrested.15 A number of representatives of opposition political parties found themselves subject to attack when they attempted to participate in election registration procedures. For example:

o On 17 November, an observer and representative of the Communist Party in Port Sudan, Constituency 1, named Fatah El Rahaman was arrested and attacked
o On 22 November, Suliman Mahmed, a representative of the Democratic Unionist Party, was arrested in Constituency 18 in Nyala South.
o 26 members of the NISS arrested and beat up an observer of the communist party, Mohamed Abdelmonim Umar, when he recorded violations at a registration centre using his camera. He was beaten, arrested, and taken to a security detention centre.
o On 23 November in Constituency 43, Omar Allah, a member of the Umma Party, was arrested and detained for four hours at a police station in Al Kalakla.
o  On 2 December, NISS agents in Nyala, South Darfur, arrested the Communist Party’s observer, Taifur Amin Abdela.
o In Constituency 42 in Al Kalakla in Wagda, a woman by the name of Manot Hamda Rahmid was arrested due to her refusal to hand over her voting ID card to the popular committee.

In a complaint made by Nafi Ali Nafi, the NCP’s Deputy of Organisational Affairs to the chair of the NEC, he alleged that the SPLM committed serious violations against NCP members who were involved in registration efforts in the South, and cited a large number of incidents of arrest, torture, and intimidation, including:

o In East Equatorial State, members of the NCP were expelled from Torit after the arrest, beating, and assault of their colleagues. Moreover, NCP member Olbino Mad was stabbed by Sonki. NCP members were intimidated by the SPLM’s commander Brigadier Johnson, and the State Governor accompanied by the General Directorate of the Equatorial Police closed the local registration centre, and denied access to any person who was not an SPLM member.
o In Central Equatorial State, James Iocodu, a member of the NCP, was arrested and subjected to torture. In addition, a female NCP leader was threatened over the phone for her NCP activities. 19 other NCP members and observers were arrested and expelled in the towns of Kwajena, Kamly, Gety, and Roj Roj.

In turn, a report on the election registration issued by the SPLM also alleges intimidation of SPLM observers and misuse of state resources, including:

o In Constituency 16, a car belonging to the armed forces and used by Tigani Siraj of the military service was used to transport NCP members to and from registration centres.
o  It was alleged that in Constituency No 17 of Um Alghura, where there was an attempt by the registration committee to register individuals in their absences. After an objection made by the observer Abdel Ghadir Alhameem, the process was stopped.
o In Constituency 20 of the Abusagra registration centre, Alhaj Abdellah and Wad Alhadad, Al Gezira state along with NCP local popular committee members Mosa Mohamed Ali, Alam Aldeen Hassan, Shalah Habeeb, and Bashir Mahmoud beat a representative of the SPLM, Abdelrahman Alameed, after his objection to people present outside of the registration centre that were not members of any political party. Though he filed a criminal case against the perpetrators on 12 December at Alhaj Abdalah police station, no one has yet been arrested.
o The Registration Committee of Rufaa Alwousta at Alhilalia recommendation centre registered residents of Edris Village at 10 PM in their homes, after the closure of the local registration centre. They were registered as residents of Almagharba village.

Manipulation after the Registration Process
A particularly problematic element of voter registration has been the widespread reports of documentation or confiscation of voter registration cards after the completion of the formal voter registration process.

In particular, the NCP reportedly set up tents outside registration centres, where people exiting the registration centres were reportedly told to handover their IDs for safekeeping. If they refuse to hand over their ID cards, representatives instead record their serial numbers, and explain the process as necessary to complete registration. Citizens have also reported their registration IDs, election notification badges, and receipt slips collected by local popular
committee members, local governance structures that often have close ties to the NCP. This process has been documented in centres across Sudan, including Constituency 34 in Kalakla West, Constituency 42 in Kalakla Unity, and Constituency 22 in Unity. Complaints have been made by opposition parties to the NEC, but the Commission took no action other than to state in Constituency 43 that NCP members should stay 250 meters away from the polls. The NEC’s decision to issue receipts with a unique voter registration serial numbers acted as a safeguard for the registration process. However, many registration officials failed to inform registrant that the receipt must be kept secure. There were many reports of political parties collecting receipts of newly registered voters, or of receipts being traded or sold in some areas. Granted, many voters may no longer have these receipts on election day, but the NEC must take additional steps to ensure that polling officials can verify individual’s names on the electoral registry (again highlighting the need to publish full lists) and to ensure the integrity of the polling exercise. The Chairman of the NCP in Western Equatoria, Awad Kisanga, called on the population to register, saying that “voter registration is the only weapon or spear or kill any bad leadership that civilians may think is hampering service delivery.” A leader of the SPLM made a similar statement on 3 November.16

In many cases, political parties were able to deploy party agents at registration centres, though this was to lesser extent in South Sudan. The NCP’s collection of voter materials such as receipts, registration numbers, and other identifying details is not a direct violation of electoral law. However, this practice was never explained and many believed that it was an official step of registration. Representatives of the NCP and SPLM were observed to be directly participating in registration. Organised political party activity in such proximity of registration centres is problematic and could undermine public confidence.

Specific incidents documented by the African Centre include:

o In Northern Sudan in Algolid, Constituency 51, NCP members collected registration IDs, and sometimes returned them after registering the numbers on it. The representative of the NCP, Thuraja Mohamed Taha, brought the names of 35 women and gave it to the registration committee. Representatives of the NCP brought forth a list containing 485 names, and handed it over to the local committee.
o  In Marawi South, Constituency Number 26, the Head of the Election Committee refused to give the total number of registrants. Numbers 57-64 of the list were left blank.
o In Langate Centre, badges for political representatives were not handed out when the process began, and SPLM members were kicked out of Transet centre.
o  In Khartoum, in Alshagrah Centre, many residential certificates were forged, and NCP members registered people inside the centres. Though observers protested, their rejection was refused. In Constituency 39 of Jabrah, NCP members collected registration receipts through mobile devices that was done in a car without a license plate located in front of the registration centre.
o  In some cases, this policy of confiscation became intertwined with livelihoods, as employers threatened to withhold salaries if cards were not handed over. In Nyala, Darfur, the director of the hospital administration for the Ministry of Health in Darfur issued a circular that all people who worked for the Ministry and hospital should turn over their registration IDs to the Assistant Administrator. Included in this circular was the news that salaries would be withheld until IDs were turned over to the committee. In Halfa Algadida, eastern Sudan in Village 10, all IDs were collected by the NCP member Fathi Mohamed Osman. In Rabak, White Nile state, the commander of Regiment 47, Hamed Mahmood, issued an order for all his employees to hand in their registration forms to an administrative non-official centre set up for this purpose.

The SPLM also included similar violations in its report on registration, for example, alleging that the governor of South Gezira locality, Mohamed Omer Abu Alhassan, collected registration cards from people in Aldinagela.

Human Rights Violations and Suppression of Political Expression

The Registration Period in Sudan was not without serious restrictions to the freedom of expression and association, and particularly harassment and intimidation of political party members and activists. Political freedoms, including the right to peaceful assembly, must be respected. Security forces must refrain from politically motivated arrests in order to ensure that members of all political parties are free to conduct political activities without fear of arrest or harassment. This is a benchmark to determining the credibility of upcoming elections. However, such rights were observed not to be respected in practice, for example:

o In the lead up to the elections, serious allegations of obstruction have been noted against members of the SPLA and the NCP. An NCP member claimed to be arrested and detained twice in South Sudan, on 1 and 10 November. Apparently his arrest was the result of entering a military zone without authorization.
o On 2 November, SPLA soldiers, some of whom were serving in Joint Integration Units, allegedly interrupted a conference held in Juba, South Sudan, and arrested an NCP member in attendance who was held in an SPLM military detention cell for several hours. Before his release, he was threatened to never attend a conference again. Another NCP member was arrested by the SPLA, this time in Geissan locality on 23 November 2009. He was detained for a day before the local security committee arranged for his release.
o During the registration phase, serious infringements on the right to freedom of expression and association came following the arrest and detention of political party activists, as well as obstruction of public rallies. On 3 November, a request to hold a public rally in Bahri, North Khartoum, by a group of legally registered National Democratic Alliance (NDA) political party members was deferred to the NISS. On 17 November, the NDA made a follow up request to receive a permit, which received no response. A directive issued by the Minister of Interior on 17 September stated that political parties wishing to hold public events must provide written notification to the police, who may then submit an application to the state or local security committee, if necessary. The police must provide applicants with a decision within 72 hours.

Recommendations
The violations and irregularities documented above in relation to the registration process mean that the electoral process is building on a cracked foundation. Unsolved complaints on constituencies’ delimitation were a mark on the elections process, that is now topped by violations of registration. As a result, urgent action needs to be taken both to address existing weaknesses ahead of the April elections and to creating stronger electoral structures for Sudan’s future.
The culmination of registration demands that a renewed focus be placed on ensuring accuracy of voter rolls, protecting the genuine expression of civil and political rights by individuals, associations, and political parties during the pre-electoral period, resolving longstanding technical and administrative issues relating to elections implementation, dispute over census results and installing necessary reform legislation to ensure an enabling and inclusive political environment. The political environment must be improved in an open and transparent way for genuinely free and fair elections to be held.

In particular, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies recommends that:

o The weaknesses in the legal regime, including the 2008 Elections Act should be reformed. In particular, agents other than the President should have the right to suggest names for inclusion in the Electoral Committee.
o Measures should urgently be taken to build confidence on the inclusiveness and accuracy of voter registration, the NEC and state election committees. One such measure should be a public audit of the preliminary voters’ lists, and the NEC and state elections committee should assist in technical support to state election committees to compile data electronically. The NEC should make the voter registry available to all political parties, and national and international observers for thorough examination and audit. The NEC must include public information efforts to illuminate the importance of a citizen review of the list.
o A broad civic education programme should be undertaken immediately, in order to ensure that the population taking part in the elections fully understands the significance of elections, voting procedures and has adequate information about their choices.
o Severe logistical challenges in terms of materials and access to vulnerable populations have been exacerbated by the lack of timely distributions of funding. Given severe communications and transport challenges, particularly in South Sudan, state elections committees must receive critical funding from Khartoum in a timely fashion.
o Human rights protections related to the peaceful expression of political opinion, including the rights to freedom of assembly and association, must be scrupulously safeguarded in the run up to elections.
o The NEC must take special measures to facilitate the process of registration and polling for vulnerable and historically marginalised populations, including IDPs, nomads and the populations of Sudan’s peripheries. In particular, special efforts must be taken to ensure access by IDPs to the electoral process, consistent with international safeguards to guarantee the civil and political rights of IDPs.
o The State Election High Committee in South Sudan must receive greater resources for a successful and inclusive electoral process. Many of the State Election High Committees have voiced concern publicly on lack of resources and funding on FM radio stations throughout the South, and in consultations with NGOs.
o Access to information through the NEC must be improved, and given in a much more reliable and transparent fashion.
o The voter registry released by the NEC has not been verified, which is of concern in light of complaints made by political parties and independent observers, both national and domestic. There is a need for an independent and external auditing of the registry by the Sudanese people.
o It is difficult to say that the Sudanese registration process was entirely a success. While there were no major incidents of widespread violence, many logistical issues and incidents of political obstruction impeded the beginnings of what will be a complex electoral process. These multifaceted issues include a lack of materials (especially in the South), lack of voter education and civic engagement on the registration process and its significance, and the significant number of members of the military registering in several locations, including their barracks, registration centres, and Darfur.

1 “Statement on Sudan’s Voter Registration”, the Carter Center, 17 December 2009.
2 For more information, please see Sudan Human Rights Monitor, Issue 3. African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, August-September 2009.
3 National Election Act, art. 18 (1) and (3).
4 “Civic/Voter Education Guidebook”, the NEC, November 2009.
5 Ibid.
6 Forum of Civil Society Organisations for Elections: Registration Report,,The Citizen, 6 December 2009.
7 UNICEF’s ChildInfo, available online at http://www.childinfo.org/birth_registration_tables.php.
8 “Statement on Sudan’s Voter Registration”, the Carter Center, 17 December 2009.
9“Cuibet County Voter Registration Improves though Troubles Remain”, Sudan Tribune, 19 November.
10“Chairman of Elections Commission: Elections will be Held in the Fixed Time and according to the Timetable”, SUNA News Agency, 2 December 2009.
11 “Former rebels asks extension of voter registration in Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, 12 December 2009.
12 Bartlett, Anne, “A Final Move to Exterminate the People of Darfur,” 4 February 2010.
13 National Election Act, art. 76(4).
14 Ngor Arol Garang, “Northern Bahr el Ghazal runs short of voter registration materials,” 18 November 2009.
15 See a more complete list in the section on human rights violations below.
16 NCP in Western Equatoria State, 6 November http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33019

This post is also available in: Arabic